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 In frictionless markets, asset prices reﬂect public news instantaneously.
We should therefore observe price changes only on announcements. Empiri-
cally, we see asset prices also change in the absence of announcements. This
observation motivates the introduction of several market frictions to improve
our understanding of asset price behavior and a prominent one is asymmetric
information. That is, information is distributed asymmetrically across agents
in the economy and the equilibrium price is learned through iterating over
price quotes and updating based on the (aggregate) order imbalances that
these prices provoke.1 The market aggregates private information.
Recent evidence indicates that such private information is broader than
the classic equity market interpretation of a private signal on a stock’s future
dividends. In the equity market itself, for example, the order ﬂow is infor-
mative beyond the conjectured idiosyncratic eﬀect as it contains a common
factor that correlates with daily market returns.2 Furthermore, order ﬂow in
nonequity markets, such as the currency and the treasury market, correlates
signiﬁcantly with permanent price changes.3 Inspired by asset pricing mod-
els, the literature proposes that order ﬂow conveys private information about
the agent’s optimization problem at the micro level, including her preferences
and her endowments.4
Our main goal is to identify this source of information in the order ﬂow—
the part that captures the aggregation of private (micro) information from
1In El´ ements d’´ economie politique pure, Walras (1889) ﬁrst introduces the idea of
tˆ atonnement, where agents submit buy (sell) orders when prices are low (high). Prices
adjust to reﬂect the order imbalance until there are no additional orders. The equilibrium
value has been discovered.
2See Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001). Edelen and Warner (2001) ﬁnd correlated mutual
fund ﬂow to be part of this factor.
3See, e..g., Evans and Lyons (2002) and Evans and Lyons (2008) for the FX market
and Brandt and Kavajecz (2004), Green (2004), and Pasquariello and Vega (2007) for the
treasury bond market.
4See, e.g., Evans and Lyons (2002), Gallmeyer, Holliﬁeld, and Seppi (2005), and Saar
(2007).
1the economy. The existing studies cannot identify this source for two rea-
sons. First, they are based on interdealer ﬂow which reﬂects customer order
ﬂow5, but also contains dealer-initiated trades. These trades might reﬂect
information other than the type we aim to identify, as some dealers might,
for example, be superior information processors.6 Also, dealers might initiate
trades based on privately observing their customer identity, which endoge-
nously biases dealer ﬂow informativeness as a measure of customer ﬂow in-
formativeness. We elaborate on this ﬂow-based speculation argument below.
Second, existing studies do not control for a potential reverse causality due
to “feedback trading” on stale prices. That is, public information arrives
that causes the eﬃcient price to change and, at the same time, agents trade
against outstanding (stale) quotes that stand in the way of price adjustment.
Hence, in the interval we witness a price change and trades in the direction
of the change.
We turn to trading in 30-year treasury futures following macroeconomic
announcements as an appropriate laboratory to identify private informa-
tion aggregation in the economy for two main reasons. First, intermediaries
have to report for-customer trades, which allows us to remove intermediary-
initiated ﬂow from the net order ﬂow. Second, we observe the public signal—
the macro “surprise”—and can therefore identify and remove the part of order
ﬂow that is feedback trading.
5Dealers typically accommodate a customer order completely and then actively unload
their inventory in the interdealer market. For example, a customer sell order therefore
creates a series of sell orders in the aggregate interdealer market. See Lyons (1997) for a
discussion of such “hot potato trading.”
6Anand and Subrahmanyam (2007) ﬁnd that for the Toronto stock exchange the most
informative trades are initiated by intermediaries unrelated to how much access they have
to customer ﬂow. Pan and Poteshman (2006) and Kurov and Lasser (2004) show that
one potential source of such information is proximity to the aggregate order ﬂow. By
nature, this information is a short-lived (as dealers typically go home ﬂat) whereas our
focus is on the “long-lived” macro information that markets produce when aggregating
micro customer ﬂow.
2Our results show that oﬀ-market customer ﬂow is important for discover-
ing the equilibrium riskfree rate. Relative to nonannouncement days, we ﬁnd
that customer ﬂow is signiﬁcantly more informative on price changes in the
ﬁrst 15 minutes after an announcement. Economically, the contribution of
customer ﬂow to price discovery is substantial as, after removal of the “feed-
back trading” part, it accounts for one-fourth of the (explained) riskfree rate
change.7 We further ﬁnd that this informativeness increase is signiﬁcantly
larger for those months in which the dispersion in analyst forecasts is high.
This suggests that intermediaries rely more heavily on customer ﬂow at times
of high disagreement on macro fundamentals.
Our ﬁnding provides further insight into the price discovery process in
treasury markets. Prior studies also address the issue, but, unlike us, they
use GovPX data that only covers interdealer ﬂow and they are therefore
unable to identify the origination of the information. For example, Edering-
ton and Lee (1993) and Fleming and Remolona (1999) report a strong in-
stantaneous response of treasury bond prices to an announcement, but also
increased volatility in the minutes after the announcement. Green (2004)
documents that in the ﬁrst 15 minutes after the announcement treasury
returns show increased sensitivity to order ﬂow relative to the same time
interval on nonannouncement days. Pasquariello and Vega (2007) ﬁnd that
the correlation increases with the dispersion in analyst forecasts.8
In addition to customer trade identiﬁcation, our treasury futures sample
has some attractive features. First, we do not need an algorithm to sign
7Speciﬁcally, we decompose the increase (relative to nonannouncement days) of the
(explained) riskfree rate variance in the 15 minutes after the announcement and ﬁnd that
76.0% is instantaneous and 24.0% is learned from customer ﬂow.
8Pasquariello and Vega (2007) develop a model that predicts a liquidity improvement
in the presence of a public signal (corollary 2 on p.1984). The prediction appears at odds
with Green’s ﬁndings, but the two can be reconciled if one allows for an increased rate of
(exogenous) information arrival in the announcement interval. That is, the announcement
itself makes agents re-optimize at the micro level and markets aggregate through order
ﬂow.
3trades, as the data identiﬁes for all customer transactions whether these
customers buy or sell. Second, it is comprehensive as 30Y treasury futures
capture 95% of the trading volume in the spot and futures markets for this
maturity (see Fleming and Sarkar (1999)).
The second part of the paper generates further support for customer
ﬂow informativeness through an analysis of own-account proﬁtability in the
cross-section of intermediaries. The key idea is that the intermediary beneﬁts
from privately observing the identify of her customer. The futures exchange
forbids any activity for own-account ahead of executing a client order on
the ﬂoor, i.e. broker-dealers cannot frontrun a client order nor execute it
(partially) against their own account (see Grossman (1989, p.6)).9 As the
origination of the order is not revealed in the trading process, after executing
her client order the intermediary still beneﬁts from having privately observed
her customer identity by trading for own-account (on the ﬂoor) in same the
direction as her customer if her customer was informed (“piggyback”) and
in the opposite direction if her customer was uninformed. The aggregate
(i.e. customer plus own-account) net trade in the interdealer ﬂow therefore
ampliﬁes the information part and reduces the noise part of the customer
order. Zero-proﬁt market makers rationally charge higher price impacts to
protect themselves against such ﬂow-based speculation, which thus endoge-
nously biases interdealer ﬂow informativeness as a measure of customer ﬂow
9This institutional feature makes an alternative explanation for own-account proﬁtabil-
ity based on bargaining power in the spirit of Green, Holliﬁeld, and Sch¨ urhoﬀ (2007)
unlikely.
4informativeness.10
We exploit the large cross-section of 3,382 intermediaries and relate own-
account proﬁtability to customer ﬂow access to provide direct evidence on
ﬂow-based speculation. We ﬁnd two key results. First, we report that own-
account proﬁtability is higher for intermediaries who also trade for customers
(“duals”) relative to those who do not (“locals”). The benchmarking against
locals serves to control for the increased cost of market-making in the volatile
postannouncement period.11 Second, we exploit the cross-section of duals to
show that their own-account proﬁtability increases with access to customer
ﬂow, where we control for volatility, competition, and the macro “surprise.”
Intermediaries therefore appear to trade proﬁtably on the information in
customer ﬂow, which feeds our earlier concern that (part of) the increased
sensitivity of riskfree rate change to (aggregate) interdealer ﬂow might be
endogenously generated.
We entertain the alternative explanation that intermediaries with supe-
rior trading skill are likely to attract more customers (see, e.g., Grossman
(1989)), which makes the correlation between own-account proﬁtability and
access to customer ﬂow entirely spurious. To control for skill, we compare an
intermediary’s own-account proﬁtability on announcement days where she
has access to customer ﬂow relative to announcement days where she does
not and ﬁnd signiﬁcantly increased proﬁtability on days where she has ac-
10The idea that intermediaries beneﬁt from discriminating informed from uninformed
ﬂow is well-established in the literature. Market markers cream-skim uninformed ﬂow
(see, e.g., Beneviste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992), Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996) and
Chung, Chuwonganant, and McCormick (2004)). Brokers trade along informed ﬂow (Fish-
man and Longstaﬀ (1992)) or against uninformed ﬂow (Roell (1990), Madrigal (1996)).
Appendix A illustrates the idea in a Kyle (1985) setup and includes a rational response
of the informed customer who reduces her order size in anticipation of the intermediary’s
speculation.
11We ﬁnd supportive evidence for such increased cost of market-making as a local’s
(gross) own-account proﬁtability per round-trip trade is higher in the ﬁrst 15 minutes
after an announcement relative to proﬁtability in the same period on nonannouncement
days. We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly increased bid-ask spread in this period.
5cess to customer ﬂow. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that on the announcement days
that she does not trade for customers, her own-account proﬁtability is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from own-account proﬁtability of locals. These results
rule out that exceptional trading skill drives a dual trader’s increased prof-
itability.12
We further analyze postannouncement trading to ﬁrmly establish that
the increased sensitivity of riskfree rate changes to customer ﬂow reﬂects in-
formation. We realize that in inactive markets any regression of price change
on signed ﬂow might pick up a transitory price eﬀect to compensate for the
cost of market-making. For example, the increased sensitivity might reﬂect
that risk-averse dealers require higher compensation for carrying inventory
through time on increased postannouncement volatility. We consider this
noninformation explanation unlikely for our ﬁve-minute regressions in what
is a very active market. That is, for an average announcement day ﬁve-
minute interval, 172.9 intermediaries generate 595.9 transactions. Moreover,
if we regress interest rate changes on only those customer orders that trade
through intermediaries who do not trade for own-account that day, we ﬁnd
unchanged sensitivity.13 Consistent with the ﬂow-based speculation, it seems
that intermediaries endogenously choose to trade for own-account on recog-
nizing informed customers in their total customer ﬂow.
Finally, we contribute to the dual-trading literature. Chakravarty and Li
(2003) study eight CME futures contracts and ﬁnd that dual traders supply
liquidity and actively manage inventory. Manaster and Mann (1996) corrob-
orate these ﬁndings in their CME futures study, but, much to their surprise,
also report a positive correlation between signed inventory and the interme-
12We interpret trading skill broadly to include an ability to quickly process and interpret
macro news as in Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997).
13This is not an order size eﬀect, as customer orders in this subset are larger than the
average customer order.
6diary reservation price. They conclude that intermediaries are not “passive
order-ﬁllers,...but active proﬁt-seeking individuals with heterogeneous lev-
els of information and/or trading skill.” We establish that one channel is
access to informative customer ﬂow. Most related to our study is Fishman
and Longstaﬀ (1992) who propose a model to illustrate that the decision to
trade for own-account is endogenous, i.e. the intermediary does so if she has
private knowledge on the composition of her customer order ﬂow. Our study
diﬀers in three ways. First, we focus on trading in the wake of a macro-
announcement so as to control for a reverse causality caused by “feedback
trading.” We establish that customer ﬂow is indeed informative. Second, we
exploit a large cross-section of duals to establish that access to customer ﬂow
is a key determinant of own-account proﬁtability. Third, we study a much
larger sample (42.5 million trades in 4 years vs. 305,982 trades in 15 days)
and beneﬁt from statistical power which, for example, allows us to reject the
alternative explanation based on trading skill, which could not be rejected
in Fishman and Longstaﬀ (1992).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses
the institutional background, the data, and provides summary statistics. Sec-
tion 2 studies customer order ﬂow informativeness on announcement days
(relative to nonannouncement days). Section 3 calculates the intermediary’s
own-account trading proﬁt and relates it to access to customer ﬂow. Section 4
analyzes who eﬀectively pays the intermediary’s increased proﬁtability. Sec-
tion 5 concludes.
71 Background, data, and summary statistics
1.1 Background
We analyze four years (1994-1997) of trading in 30Y treasury futures at the
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). At the time, this contract is one of the most
liquid securities with 485.2 trades every ﬁve minutes on nonannouncement
days and even more on announcement days.14 Almost all trading is ﬂoor
trading from 8.20 a.m. to 3.00 p.m. Eastern Time (ET), although after-
hours electronic trading volume had been growing. Trading occurs in a pit
by means of the so-called open outcry method. Floor traders negotiate prices
by shouting out orders to other ﬂoor traders, indicating quantity and trade
direction through hand signals. Other ﬂoor traders bid on the orders, also
using hand signals. Once ﬁlled, an order is recorded separately by both
parties to a trade. At the end of the day, the clearinghouse settles trades
and ensures that there is no discrepancy in the matched trade information.
After a criminal inquiry in 1989, the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC)—the main regulatory body of futures exchanges—continues
to allow dual trading, but tightens surveillance. An FBI sting operation at
the CBOT and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) ﬁnds that brokers
(including dual traders) are cheating customers and leads to dozens of ar-
rests. In 1992, Congress mandates that futures markets keep audit trails.
The CFTC pressures both CBOT and CME to supply the information with
the threat of a dual trading ban, in case the exchanges fail to comply.15
Today, dual trading continues to be allowed in most futures markets. The
exceptions are some CME futures contracts, mostly those with a history of
14345.9+112.3=485.2, see Table 2. Note that this table double-counts out of necessity,
as we also report trade activity by trader type. We double-count throughout the paper in
order to be consistent.
15See, e.g., “CFTC demands tighter controls,” Financial Times, 8/13/96.
8high volume.
1.2 Data
Futures data. We beneﬁt from the CFTC audit trail data to discriminate
customer trades and own-account trades in the 30Y treasury futures mar-
ket. Each transaction record contains: Contract traded (i.e. the expiration
month); time16; buy or sell indicator; number of contracts traded; price;
identiﬁcation number for the ﬂoor trader who executes the trade; and a cus-
tomer type indicator (CTI code). These CTI codes are deﬁned in CFTC
rule 1.35(e) as: CTI1 is a trade for own account; CTI2 is a trade for clearing
member’s house account; CTI3 is a trade for another member present at the
exchange ﬂoor, or an account controlled by such other member; CTI4 is a
trade for (oﬀ-exchange) customers. Consistent with earlier studies17 we re-
strict attention to CTI1 and CTI4 trades as they represent almost all trading
volume.
We focus on the nearby futures contract and apply a number of ﬁlters to
prepare the data for analysis. We choose to analyze the nearby contract, as it
is a very close substitute for the underlying spot instrument. Consequently,
we feel that our results generalize to spot rates (see also Ederington and Lee
(1993, p.1164)). We apply the following ﬁlters. We eliminate spread trades
(e.g., butterﬂy spread trades). We remove trades that occur at unusually
low prices (primarily in May 1997). We remove trades that show an unusual
transaction return of more than 0.25% followed by a transaction return in
16Traders report time in 15-minute brackets and an exchange algorithm, known as com-
puterized trade reconstruction (CTR), times the trade to the nearest second. Although
noisy, we believe the CTR time is fairly accurate due to Congress and CFTC pressure to
provide high-quality data for surveillance. Others have used CTR time for analysis, e.g.
Fishman and Longstaﬀ (1992) and Manaster and Mann (1996).
17E.g., Fishman and Longstaﬀ (1992), Manaster and Mann (1996), and Chakravarty
and Li (2003).
9the opposite direction of more than 0.25%. We expect these trades to suﬀer
from a serious timing error. These ﬁlters eliminate 1.48% of all CTI1 and
CTI4 transactions. The ﬁnal sample includes 42.5 million observations.
Macro announcements We follow Green (2004) and use the Interna-
tional Money Market Services (MMS) data on expectations and realizations
of the most relevant 8:30 U.S. macro announcements. We are careful to re-
move days with macro announcements scheduled at a time later in the day
(e.g. 9:15 or 10:00) to create benchmark nonannouncement days that are not
contaminated by macro news trading.18 We further remove (i) days when
either the realized value or the expectation is missing, (ii) days when the Fed
announces earlier or later relative to schedule, (iii) days with unexpected
Fed announcements, (iv) days where the market is partially or completely
closed.19
[insert Table 1]
Table 1 lists the 15 macro announcements included in the sample and re-
ports their frequencies. In total, the sample contains 377 announcement days
and 350 nonannouncement days. In addition to an analysis of all announce-
ment days, we also analyze the subgroup of most inﬂuential announcements—
nonfarm payroll employment, PPI, and CPI—but also “nonfarm payroll” as
a separate group as it is the single most important announcement (see also,
e.g., Green (2004, Table III)).
Consistent with previous studies, we deﬁne announcement surprises as
the diﬀerence between realizations and expectations (see, e.g., Green (2004)
and Pasquariello and Vega (2007)). More speciﬁcally, since measurement
units vary across macro variables, we standardize the surprises by dividing
18This also removes days with e.g. both an 8:30 and a 10:00 announcement. The re-
maining announcement days are therefore 8:30-only announcement days.
19These days are 4/1/94, 4/5/94, 9/14/94, 8/26/96, 2/26/97, and 2/27/97.
10each of them by their sample standard deviation. The surprise Skt of type k
on day t is therefore
Skt =
Rkt − Mkt
σk
(1)
where Rkt is the announced value, Mkt is its MMS median forecast that
proxies for the market expectation, and σk is the sample standard deviation of
(Rkt−Mkt). Equation (1) facilitates meaningful comparisons of how the 30Y
riskfree rate responds to the diﬀerent types of macro news. Operationally,
we estimate these responses by regressing 30Y treasury futures price changes
on the surprise Skt. We note that since σk is constant for any indicator k,
the standardization does not aﬀect the statistical signiﬁcance of the response
estimates nor the ﬁt of the regressions.
1.3 Summary statistics
[insert Figure 1]
Figure 1 plots transaction prices and customer volume imbalance on a
representative macro announcement day. It illustrates some trading char-
acteristics that will turn out to be true more generally. First, the 8:30 an-
nouncement leads to an instantaneous price change of almost 1%. Second,
right after the announcement we observe increased (signed) customer volume
imbalances which level oﬀ after roughly 15 minutes. Third, in this time pe-
riod we observe large price changes that seem to correlate with the signed
customer ﬂow. These ﬁndings are consistent with earlier papers (see, e.g.,
Fleming and Remolona (1999) and Green (2004)).
[insert Figure 2]
Intraday patterns. Figure 2 presents the intraday patterns of volatility,
the bid-ask spread, and volume. We use all 377 announcement days and 350
11nonannouncement days to calculate the value for each 15-minute interval and
we estimate the patterns through regressions. We use GMM for all regressions
in the paper and we use robust Newey-West standard errors (where we allow
for autocorrelation up to three lags). We plot our estimates and we add a
solid dot when the diﬀerence between announcement and nonannouncement
days is signiﬁcant at the 99% level.
Panel (A) shows that on announcement days, volatility is unchanged
ahead of announcement, but signiﬁcantly higher in the ﬁrst half of the trad-
ing day with a clear peak in the ﬁrst 15 minutes after the announcement. To
avoid a bias due to the bid-ask bounce, we deﬁne volatility as the standard
deviation of only customer buy transaction prices20 (see also Manaster and
Mann (1996)). We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant spike in volatility of roughly 300% in
the 15 minutes after the announcement. For the rest of the day, volatility
levels remain increased relative to nonannouncement days, but the increase
is substantially lower as it never exceeds 25%. The increase is statistically
signiﬁcant only in the early half of the day.
Panels (B) and (C) show a signiﬁcant volume increase throughout the
trading day on a signiﬁcantly increased bid-ask spread only in the ﬁrst 15
minutes after the announcement. We report aggregate volume (i.e. customer
plus own-account volume) and ﬁnd its increase to be similar in magnitude
to the volatility increase. We estimate the bid-ask spread as the diﬀerence
between the average (volume-weighted) customer buy price and the average
customer sell price (see also Manaster and Mann (1996)). We only ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant increase at the 99% level in the ﬁrst 15 minutes after the an-
nouncement. Economically, the increase is substantial as it exceeds 120%.
We also ﬁnd signiﬁcantly increased volume ahead of the announcement on
20Operationally, to minimize missing values, we calculate two standard deviations, one
based on customer buys, the other on customer sells. We take the maximum if both are
available.
12a signiﬁcantly lower bid-ask spread, but these eﬀects are small economically
relative to postannouncement trading.
All in all, these patterns are consistent with Green (2004) who documents
increased informed trading only for the ﬁrst 15 minutes after the announce-
ment. Our volatility and bid-ask spread patterns are consistent. The in-
creased volume in the remainder of the day might reﬂect inventory-sharing
trades among market makers who are pushed into suboptimal positions in
the ﬁrst 15 minutes.
Customer vs. own-account trades. As it is our objective to further
understand these trading patterns, we exploit our sample’s unique feature
that it discriminates customer trades and own-account trades. We follow the
literature (see, e.g., Fishman and Longstaﬀ (1992)) and disaggregate volume
for each day according to (i) whether the intermediary trades for customers
and own-account that day21 and (ii) whether the trade is a customer trade or
an own-account trade. We label the order ﬂow accordingly, i.e. we get four
categories:
1. Customer trades through duals, i.e. customer trades through an inter-
mediary who also trades for own account
2. Own-account trades by duals, i.e. own-account trades of an intermedi-
ary who also trades for customers
3. Customer trades through brokers, i.e. customer trades through an in-
termediary who does not trade for own account
4. Own-account trades by locals, i.e. own-account trades of an intermedi-
ary who does not trade for customers
21We use a 2% error margin for classiﬁcation (i.e., no own-account trades means less
than 2% of the intermediary’s trades are for own-account) as CFTC and exchange staﬀ
acknowledge the presence of error trades and consider the 2% ﬁlter reasonable (see Chang,
Locke, and Mann (1994)).
13We emphasize that an intermediary’s label as broker, local, or dual is based on
her activity on a particular day and, throughout the sample, an intermediary
can therefore have broker days, local days, and dual days.
[insert Table 2]
Table 2 presents trade statistics for announcement as well as nonan-
nouncement days. Panel A testiﬁes to the high activity in the 30Y treasury
futures market. On nonannouncement days, we ﬁnd that, on average, in
a ﬁve-minute interval 42.4 intermediaries trade customer orders and 116.8
trade for own-account. They generate 112.3 and 345.9 trades, respectively.
On announcement days, the number of active traders increases by approxi-
mately 20% and the number of transactions by 30%.
Panel A further disaggregates activity according to intermediary type and
ﬁnds, for nonannouncement days, that the majority of active intermediaries
acts as local (65%)22, followed by dual (28%), and broker (7%). Clearly, dual
activity continues to be substantial in the aftermath of the 1992 Congress
mandate (see Section 1.1), in particular with regard to customer trades.
For the average ﬁve-minute interval, 34.5 duals carry out an aggregate 90.9
transactions for their customers vs. 7.9 brokers who carry out 21.4 customer
transactions.23 Trade size is larger for brokers, but even in terms of volume
duals carry out most customer orders. Furthermore, the bid-ask spread is
higher for customer trades through duals vs. brokers, which is a ﬁrst indica-
tion that their order ﬂow includes the informed customer orders.
For announcement days, activity is higher across all trader types, trades
are larger, and bid-ask spreads are higher. These changes appear to be pro-
22100%*81.4/(81.4+35.4+7.9).
23Note that we ﬁnd a slight diﬀerence between the number of duals active based on
own-account counting (35.4 per ﬁve-minute interval) or for-customer counting (34.5). This
diﬀerence is due to the counting procedure, as, apparently, a dual’s own-account trading
is more spread out in the day, while her costumer ﬂow concentrates in some intervals.
14portional across trader types, so that on a relative basis the nonannounce-
ment day characterization of trading remains true for announcement days.
The same goes for the ﬁrst 15 minutes after the announcement with the ex-
ception that the proportional increase in customer trades is larger than the
increase in own-account trades.24
Panel B presents the mean and standard deviation of ﬁve-minute signed
customer volume in the 15 minutes after a macro announcement. These
statistics are useful for our main analysis in the next section where we explore
customer ﬂow as an explanatory variable for 30Y treasury returns. The panel
shows that, on average, customers are net buyers after an announcement but
their net ﬂow has a very large standard deviation relative to its mean. For the
category of all announcement days, for example, we ﬁnd that net customer
ﬂow is 0.142 with a standard deviation of 1.282. We decompose customer ﬂow
and ﬁnd that dual-intermediated net ﬂow is larger than broker-intermediated
net ﬂow. We ﬁnd that net ﬂow standard deviation on announcement days
is higher than nonannouncement days and increases with the importance of
the announcement.
2 Customer order informativeness
In this section, we pursue our main objective, which is to establish the in-
creased informativeness of customer ﬂow after a macro announcement. We
consider this an important result, as it shows that intermediaries need oﬀ-
exchange customer response to fully appreciate the eﬀect of the macro an-
nouncement on the 30Y riskfree rate. Green (2004) documents empirical
support as he ﬁnds an increased correlation between treasury returns and
signed volume in the 15 minutes after an announcement. He cannot, how-
24These results are not included for brevity, but are available upon request.
15ever, identify that this information is in customer ﬂow, as his signed volume
is based on interdealer ﬂow which, in addition to customer ﬂow, also contains
trades initiated by potentially superiorly informed intermediaries. In addi-
tion, the correlation might be endogenously biased upwards due to ﬂow-based
speculation by dual traders (see Appendix A).
2.1 Five-minute price change regressions on customer
ﬂow
We assess customer ﬂow informativeness through a regression of ﬁve-minute
price changes on aggregate signed customer ﬂow. We prefer time-interval
return regressions (as in Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) and Pasquariello and
Vega (2007)) to trade return regressions (as in Green (2004)), as the aggrega-
tion alleviates any eﬀect any time-stamp errors might have. Consistent with
previous studies, we add the macro surprise to the regression and estimate:
pt,h − pt,h−1 = da(αa + βaωt,h) + dn(αn + βnωt,h) +
X
k
γkIk,tSk,t + εt,h (2)
where pt,h is 100 times the log price (to get % returns) at day t and ﬁve-
minute interval h, da (dn) is a dummy that is one on an announcement
(nonannouncemement) day, zero otherwise, ωt,h is the aggregate signed cus-
tomer volume, Sk,t is the announcement surprise (see equation (1)), Ik,t is
a dummy that is one for the time interval immediately after the announce-
ment, zero otherwise,25 and εt,k is the error term. The regression implicitly
controls for feedback trading through inclusion of the macro surprise, i.e. any
eﬀect of ωk,t is identiﬁed oﬀ of the orthogonalized component relative to the
25In the implementation, we do allow for the surprise to also aﬀect later time intervals
(i.e. 8:35-8:40, 8:40-8:45, ...) and ﬁnd no signiﬁcance. For robustness, we nevertheless
repeat all analysis based on equation (2) and ﬁnd that our results are not aﬀected.
16other explanatory variables.26 We emphasize that this is a contribution of
our approach, as Green (2004, p.1210) only includes the surprise in the ﬁrst
transaction return after the announcement and therefore orthogonalizes only
the ﬁrst postannouncement transaction.
[insert Figure 3]
Figure 3 depicts the intraday pattern of customer ﬂow informativeness on
announcement as well as nonannouncement days. We estimate equation (2)
separately for all 15-minute intervals in the trading day and test whether
customer ﬂow informativeness (β) is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent on announcement
days relative to nonannouncement days.27 We ﬁnd it to be signiﬁcantly higher
in the 15 minutes subsequent to the announcement and generally insigniﬁcant
for the remainder of the day. Economically, informativeness roughly doubles
in these 15 minutes and the intraday pattern is therefore comparable—in
shape and magnitude—to the bid-ask spread pattern.
[insert Table 3]
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results of a regression of returns on
customer ﬂow in the 15 minutes after the announcement (equation (2)). Al-
though macro surprise coeﬃcients (γk) are not reported for brevity, we ﬁnd
that 9 out of the 15 announcement surprises signiﬁcantly aﬀects subsequent
returns, where, generally, procyclical announcements (e.g., nonfarm payroll
employment) negatively aﬀect returns and countercyclical announcements
(e.g., initial unemployment claims) positively aﬀect returns. Among these
announcements, we ﬁnd that nonfarm payroll employment, producer price
26This relies on one of the statistical properties of linear regression, which is that any
multivariate regression coeﬃcient can be obtained through univariate regression of the
orthogonalized dependent variable on the orthogonalized explanatory variable, where the
orthogonalization is with respect to the other regressors.
27For clarity, the da dummy of equation (2) is one for all ﬁve-minute intervals in a 15
minute period.
17index (PPI), and consumer price index (CPI) have the largest economic im-
pact. We therefore repeat all regressions with only these three announcement
days and with only nonfarm payroll announcement days to verify that any
eﬀect we ﬁnd increases with the importance of the news. Panel A shows
that this is indeed the case for the customer ﬂow informativeness diﬀerential
across announcement and nonannouncement days.
We decompose the explained price change variance and ﬁnd that 24.0%
is due to customer order ﬂow where we control for feedback trading. The R-
squared shows that the announcement day regression explains 36.6% of price
change variance. We use a Cholesky decomposition on the explained part
to judge how much is due to the immediate response to the announcement
surprise and how much is due to subsequent customer ﬂow. In the order-
ing, we choose to put the announcement surprise ﬁrst so that eﬀectively the
contribution of customer ﬂow is net of the component correlated with the
announcement surprise. That is, mathematically, the eﬀect it assigns to cus-
tomer ﬂow is based on customer ﬂow orthogonalized relative to the surprise.
The decomposition assigns 76.0% to the immediate response and 24.0% to
(orthogonalized) customer ﬂow. In the procedure, we ﬁnd that 6.7% of the
explanatory power of customer ﬂow is eﬀectively due to feedback trading
as this is the size of the part that correlates with the announcement sur-
prise.28 The economic signiﬁcance of customer ﬂow is further demonstrated
by the result that a one standard deviation increase in net customer ﬂow
on announcement days (see Table 2) causes the 30Y treasury return to be
1.282*0.0439*100=6.3 basispoint higher, which is substantial relative to a 23
28We decompose the variation of X′β where X is the matrix of explanatory variables
and β is vector of coeﬃcient estimates. The customer ﬂow is the last element in the
X. Cholesky decomposes the customer ﬂow (explanatory) variation into a part that is
projected onto the macro surprises (“feedback part”, 6.7%) and an orthogonalized part
(93.3%). In the procedure we subtract the explained variation on nonannouncement days
to single out the eﬀect due to the increased informativeness.
18basispoint volatility for the full 15-minute return (see Figure 2).
Panel B of Table 3 ﬁnds that customer ﬂow informativeness increases with
the dispersion in analyst forecasts. Pasquariello and Vega (2007) ﬁnd theo-
retically as well as empirically that correlation between order ﬂow and yield
changes should increase with the dispersion of beliefs among market partic-
ipants. We follow their empirical approach and interact our customer ﬂow
variable with dummy variables that diﬀerentiates months with low, medium,
and high analyst forecast dispersion. We ﬁnd that, as expected, customer
ﬂow informativeness increases monotonically with dispersion. In our econo-
metric tests on the coeﬃcient diﬀerential across announcement and nonan-
nouncement days, we ﬁnd most signiﬁcance for the high dispersion months,
which is not surprising. In the joint test on the diﬀerential across all three
forecast dispersion regimes, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerential only for the ﬁrst
two categories: (i) all announcements and (ii) the Nonfarm, PPI, and CPI
announcements. It seems that we lack statistical power to also reject the null
of no diﬀerential for the Nonfarm only announcements.
2.2 An alternative interpretation of the regression co-
eﬃcient
So far, we interpret our regression coeﬃcient as trade informativeness. In
inactive markets, part of the price change correlated with order ﬂow is tran-
sitory in nature in order to compensate a liquidity supplier for the cost of
market-making. We consider such eﬀect unlikely for our ﬁve-minute regres-
sions in what is a very active market; we ﬁnd 172.9 intermediaries active who
collectively generate 595.9 transactions in the average ﬁve-minute interval on
announcement days (see Table 2).
[insert Table 4]
19We rerun the regressions with decomposed customer ﬂow to provide fur-
ther evidence of informativeness. We decompose customer ﬂow according to
whether it reaches the ﬂoor through brokers (who do not trade for own-
account that day) or through duals. The results in Table 4 show that
yield changes are only signiﬁcantly more sensitive to dual-intermediated cus-
tomer ﬂow on announcement days.29 The unchanged sensitivity to broker-
intermediated customer ﬂow is not a straightforward result of order size,
as, if anything, brokers intermediate larger customer orders than duals do
(see Table 2). Thus, this diﬀerential in sensitivity across dual- and broker-
intermediated ﬂow rules out a noninformation explanation based on increased
price concession due to market-making costs, as this would aﬀect all customer
ﬂow equally. Rather, we believe that the intermediary’s decision to trade for
own account is endogenous and depends on whether she traces informed cus-
tomers in her customer ﬂow in the aftermath of the announcement. We
note that this result is consistent with the higher bid-ask spread reported
for dual-intermediated customer trades relative to broker-intermediated cus-
tomer trades (see section 1.3).
3 Intermediary’s own-account trading
With the result of increased customer ﬂow informativeness after an informa-
tion event, we analyze whether intermediaries beneﬁt from direct access to
customer ﬂow through own-account trading. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, screening out the customer ﬂow and discriminating informed from unin-
formed customers, the intermediary’s rational strategy is to trade along with
29We admit that the lack of signiﬁcance for broker-intermediated ﬂow might be the
result of statistical power as in the average ﬁve-minute interval we ﬁnd that the ratio of
the number of active duals to the number of active brokers is roughly four (see Table 2).
On the other hand, the sign of the diﬀerential of broker-intermediated customer ﬂow across
announcement days is wrong in two of the three cases.
20informed customers and opposite to uninformed orders (see Appendix A).
3.1 Is direct access to customer ﬂow proﬁtable?
Inspired by Fishman and Longstaﬀ (1992), we analyze own-account trad-
ing proﬁtability for intermediaries with access to customer ﬂow (duals) and
intermediaries without such access (locals) in the 15 minutes after the an-
nouncement. We deﬁne proﬁtability as:
πkt =
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where πkt is the proﬁt per round-trip contract30 for intermediary k on day
t, Nb
kt (Ns
kt) is the total number of buys (sells), qb
jkt (qs
jkt) is the quantity of
the jth transaction in terms of number of contracts, P b
jkt (P s
jkt) is the associ-
ated price, and REFPt is the reference price in day t. The proﬁt calculation
assumes that the intermediary starts with zero inventory and liquidates his
end-of-period position at a reference price REFPt. We present results where
we set the reference price equal to the last transaction price in the measure-
ment interval. For robustness, we also analyze proﬁts based on the end-of-day
settlement price as reference price, which gives qualitatively similar results.31
We note that, by construction, this proﬁt is net of adverse-selection cost (as
it aggregates across multiple subsequent transactions and therefore includes
losses due to adverse selection), but gross of market-making cost (e.g., in-
ventory cost, order-procession cost).
[insert Table 5]
30We use a per-contract proﬁt measure to control for trade activity, as locals are more
active than duals.
31Available from the authors upon request.
21Table 5 reports round-trip proﬁtability per contract for duals and locals
on announcement and nonannouncement days. We ﬁnd very large standard
deviations due to some extreme positive and negative observations. We there-
fore prefer a nonparametric test on median diﬀerences to the standard test on
mean diﬀerences (see also Fishman and Longstaﬀ (1992)). A * (**) indicates
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between announcement and nonannouncement days
at the 95% (99%) level, whereas x (xx) indicates a signiﬁcant diﬀerence be-
tween dual proﬁtability and local proﬁtability. We emphasize two important
results.
First, we ﬁnd that a local’s proﬁtability on own-account trading is higher
on announcement days and increases with the importance of the announce-
ment. We ﬁnd that locals make a median $0.0 per contract traded round-trip
on nonannouncement days. It is signiﬁcantly higher on announcement days,
$7.8, which amounts to an approximate32 $1,063 per local for the full 15
minutes. It further increases with the importance of the announcement to
$14.8 per contract on nonfarm, PPI, and CPI days to $23.7 on the nonfarm
days. We interpret this as evidence of increased proﬁts to compensate for
the higher cost of carrying inventory through volatile times.
Second, we ﬁnd that duals appear to beneﬁt from direct access to cus-
tomer ﬂow as they trade more proﬁtably for own-account than locals do
and, more importantly, this diﬀerential is higher on announcement days.
We ﬁnd that duals make a median $2.2 per contract on nonannouncement
days, which is signiﬁcantly higher than the $0.0 locals make. The result in-
dicates that customer order ﬂow is informative even on nonannouncement
days. The important result, however, is that this diﬀerential is signiﬁcantly
32Based on 264.0 (“single-trip”) transactions of 11.3 contracts by 81.4 locals per ﬁve
minutes on nonannouncement days, a volume increase of 300% in the 15 minutes subse-
quent to an announcement, a 21% increase active locals and a negligible increase in trade
size on announcement days, i.e. $1.063≈$7.8*264*.5*11.3*3*3/(81.4*1.21) (see Table 2
and Figure 2).
22higher on announcement days. Round-trip proﬁt per contract is $6.1 ($13.9-
$7.8) higher for duals on announcement days, $8.0 higher on nonfarm, PPI,
and CPI days, and $7.6 higher on nonfarm days.
3.2 The alternative explanation: superior trading skills
Fishman and Longstaﬀ (1992) entertain the alternative explanation that
some traders have superior trading skill—trade more proﬁtably for own-
account—and customers choose to trade through these intermediaries to ben-
eﬁt from their skill. Thus, the correlation we document between trading for
customers and own-account proﬁtability might be spurious. To control for
skill, Fishman and Longstaﬀ (1992, Table 4) analyze trading proﬁt of “non-
pure” duals, i.e. intermediaries who some days trade for own-account only
(local days) and other days trade both for own-account and for customers
(dual days). We use the same approach in our sample.
[insert Table 6]
Panel A of Table 6 reports the proﬁt diﬀerential of nonpure duals on the
days they have access to customer ﬂow relative to the days that they do not
have access (i.e. own-account proﬁtability on dual days minus own-account
proﬁtability on local days). We ﬁnd that, on their dual days, they earn
a signiﬁcantly higher proﬁt than on their local days—the median diﬀeren-
tial is $5.6 per round-trip contract. We then separate announcement and
nonannouncement days and do the same analysis. Interestingly, we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcantly increased proﬁt for announcement days only. For nonannounce-
ment days, we ﬁnd no statistical diﬀerence, consistent with Fishman and
Longstaﬀ (1992). We conclude that, after control for trading skill, we con-
tinue to ﬁnd support for the premise that intermediaries rely on oﬀ-exchange
customer ﬂow to fully appreciate the eﬀect of macro news and beneﬁt from
23discriminating the informed traders in their customer ﬂow.
Panel B compares a nonpure dual’s local-day proﬁt to a (pure) local’s
proﬁt and ﬁnds no evidence of superior trading skill. For nonannouncement
days, we ﬁnd a proﬁtability of $0.0 and $0.1 on local days of nonpure duals
and locals, respectively, and the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant.
For announcement days, we ﬁnd a similar results as the proﬁtability is $7.8
and $7.8, respectively, where again the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant. This
higher proﬁtability on announcement days is likely to reﬂect increased cost of
market-making, e.g. due to higher inventory costs as result of higher volatility
(see Figure 2). In sum, the insigniﬁcant diﬀerence between nonpure duals and
locals suggests that idiosyncratic trading skill is not important in explaining
cross-sectional diﬀerences in own-account trading proﬁtability. Hence, this
makes the alternative explanation for our results unlikely.
3.3 Do proﬁts increase with the level of customer ﬂow
access?
We exploit the cross-section of duals to further establish a relationship be-
tween own-account proﬁtability and access to customer order ﬂow. We
regress a dual trader’s proﬁt per contract in the 15 minutes of postannounce-
ment trading on a measure of access to customer ﬂow and various control
variables:
πl,t = α + β1CUSTl,t + β2V OLAt + β3COMPt +
X
k
γk|Sk,t| + εl,t (4)
where πl,t is the proﬁt per contract traded round trip of dual trader l in the
15 minutes of postannouncement trading on day t, CUSTlt proxies for her
access to customer ﬂow in these 15 minutes (e.g., number of customer trades
executed per contract traded round trip, V OLAt is our volatility measure
24(see section 1.3), COMPt is a competition proxy and is deﬁned as the ratio
of the number of active intermediaries who trade for customers (i.e., dual
and brokers) and the number of customer trades, Skt is the macro surprise of
announcement type k, and εlt is the error term.33 We control for a potential
competition eﬀect, as Wahal (1997), for example, ﬁnds that the number of
dealers matters for the bid-ask spread in the NASDAQ market, which he
interprets to be “consistent with the competitive model of dealer pricing.”
We relate a dual trader’s proﬁt to her access to customer ﬂow and, therefore,
build a competition proxy on how many rivals she has for each customer
trade (i.e., duals and brokers). In addition to equation (4), we perform a
regression where we replace all control variables by a day dummy to kill all
the time eﬀect and we therefore only get traction from the cross-section. This
makes it generally harder to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant estimate of β1.34
[insert Table 7]
Table 7 shows that a dual’s own-account proﬁtability increases with access
to customer ﬂow (β1 > 0), but we only ﬁnd strong signiﬁcance if we use the
signed customer trades proxy. We number the regression results based on
the four proxies we use: number of trades, sum of signed trades, volume,
and sum of signed volume. We use trades as well as volume to account
for a potential trade size eﬀect and we use signed and unsigned to account
for a potential imbalance eﬀect. Per proxy, we perform three regressions: a
univariate regression, a regression with controls, and a regression with day
dummies. The results show a positive coeﬃcient for access to customer ﬂow
across all regressions and customer ﬂow proxies, but we only ﬁnd robust
statistical signiﬁcance for the signed customer trade proxy. Economically,
33We use the indicator l to relabel duals every day to minimize notational burden.
34The model with controls is nested in the time dummy model, as the controls are eﬀec-
tively spanned by the time dummies, i.e. they are a linear combination of these dummies.
25the eﬀect is substantial, as a one standard deviation increase in the signed
trades proxy (1.94) earns the intermediary an additional 1.94*$2.76=$5.35
per contract on her own-account trades, which is a 39% increase relative
to her $13.9 median proﬁt on announcement days.35 We further ﬁnd, not
surprisingly, that proﬁts increase with volatility (e.g., to reﬂect more costly
inventory keeping) and decrease with the level of competition.
The ﬁnding that the trade-based proxy shows stronger result than to the
volume-based proxy is not surprising in view of the ﬂow-based speculation
argument. At ﬁrst sight, the weak result on customer volume is counter-
intuitive as one expects large customer orders to be more informative than
small ones. Order size, however, is not private information to the interme-
diary as she has to execute the customer order on the ﬂoor before trading
for own-account. So size, even though potentially informative, is not private
information to her. Customer identity on the other hand is not revealed in
the trading process and remains private information to the intermediary. It
is therefore not surprising that having access to a multiplicity of customer
orders is a key driver of own-account proﬁtability rather than access to large
customer orders.
4 Who pays for the dual’s increased proﬁt?
The previous section documents that intermediaries with direct access to
customer ﬂow beneﬁt through own-account trading. We interpret this result
as evidence of ﬂow-based speculation, where the intermediary privately ob-
serves the identity of the submitting customer. In appendix A, we illustrate
the mechanism in a simple extension of the Kyle (1985) model where the in-
termediary beneﬁts from discriminating informed from uninformed customer
35See Table 2 and Table 7.
26ﬂow. She trades in the same direction as her informed customer and opposite
to her uninformed customer.
In the single intermediary world with a rational, zero-proﬁt market maker,
the intermediary’s increased proﬁt is paid for by her customers through an
increased price concession that the market maker charges to protect herself
against ﬂow-based speculation. In an multiple intermediaries setting, who
pays for the dual’s increased proﬁt critically depends on the extent that
market makers can infer which intermediaries are likely to engage in ﬂow-
based speculation. The extremes are that (i) market makers get no signal or
(ii) that they can fully discriminate the ﬂow-based speculators. In the ﬁrst
case, they charge all intermediaries the same price concession and the dual’s
increased proﬁt are eﬀectively paid for by all customers. In the second case,
the market maker only charges increased price concession to the ﬂow-based
speculators and, as a result, only their customers pay the increased proﬁt.
4.1 Proﬁtability of dual- and broker-intermediated cus-
tomer orders
We analyze customer proﬁts in the 15 minutes after the announcement to
study whether dual-intermediated customers pay a disproportionate part of
their intermediary’s increased proﬁt. We calculate customer proﬁts based on
equation (3) where we replace the intermediary’s own-account trades (CTI1)
by customer trades (CTI4).
[insert Table 8]
Table 8 shows that a dual’s customer seems to pay a disproportionate
part of her increased proﬁt. We ﬁnd that on announcement days the broker-
intermediated customer trades earn a $0.0 median proﬁt per round-trip con-
tract, whereas dual-intermediated proﬁt is signiﬁcantly lower and amounts
27to $-7.3 per contract. 36 This diﬀerence remains for the narrower sets of
important announcements, but it is insigniﬁcant probably due to low power
as the sample is considerably smaller. Our results diﬀer from Fishman and
Longstaﬀ (1992) who ﬁnd signiﬁcantly higher proﬁt for dual-intermediated
customer ﬂow, which is consistent with a model where a market maker can-
not infer which intermediary has the informed customer orders. That is, she
charges all the same price concession, which should make customer proﬁts
higher for dual-intermediated customer ﬂow as it contains the positive proﬁt
of the informed customer order. The broker-intermediated customer ﬂow,
on the other hand, does not contain such informed orders. We interpret our
result as a sign that marker makers do get a signal on who has the informed
customer ﬂow and rationally charge them an additional price concession (to
protect themselves against ﬂow-based speculation). This interpretation is
consistent with our earlier result that the bid-ask spread is higher for dual-
intermediated customer orders relative to broker-intermediated ones.
The negative customer proﬁt result begs the question: Why customers do
trade through duals if they seem to lose money? One possible explanation
is that customers do not know ex-ante if their intermediary will dual trade
that day or not. Fishman and Longstaﬀ (1992) emphasize that the interme-
diary’s decision is endogenous and depends on whether she receives informed
customer ﬂow. It is easily imaginable that this is a hard to predict event as
informed investors have an incentive to randomize across intermediaries to
hide their type as much as they can.
36The negative sign is intuitive as it indicates that customers pay for demanding liquid-
ity.
285 Conclusion
We exploit a comprehensive dataset of 42.5 million transactions in the 1994-
1997 30Y treasury futures market that captures 95% of overall volume (i.e.
including the underlying). We are able to discriminate the oﬀ-exchange cus-
tomer orders and ﬁnd that they exhibit increased informativeness in the 15
minutes after an 8:30 macro announcement. This suggests that intermedi-
aries rely on oﬀ-exchange customer orders to fully appreciate how macro news
aﬀects the 30Y riskfree rate. Green (2004) documents the increased informa-
tiveness for interdealer order ﬂow; we contribute and show that an important
channel is oﬀ-exchange customer “response” to the news. The market ap-
pears to aggregate micro information on imperfectly known preferences and
endowments throughout the economy (see, e.g., Saar (2007)).
We generate further evidence for customer ﬂow informativeness through
an analysis of own-account proﬁtability in a large cross-section of 3,382 in-
termediaries. That is, if (i) customer ﬂow is informative and if (ii) there is
heterogeneity in order informativeness across customers, then observing cus-
tomer identity is private information to the intermediary. In our market she
has to trade her customer order on the ﬂoor before being able to trade for
own-account, but customer identity does not have to be revealed on the ﬂoor.
She therefore continues to beneﬁt from having observed customer identity in-
formation and can trade on it ex-post for own account. We ﬁnd supportive
evidence for such ﬂow-based speculation. First, we ﬁnd that in the 15 minutes
after the announcement, intermediaries with access to customer ﬂow trade
a signiﬁcantly more proﬁtable for own account than intermediaries without
such access. The diﬀerence is a 78% higher median proﬁt per contract. Sec-
ond, among these intermediaries with access to customer ﬂow, own-account
proﬁtability increases with access to signed customer trades.
29Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that the trading process aggregates micro
demand from oﬀ-exchange customers to discover macro variables such as the
30Y riskfree rate. This should give further empirical foundation to current
macro models that build on agents’ decisions at the micro level.
Appendix A
In this appendix, we use the Kyle (1985) model to illustrate that price im-
pact is increased in the presence of an intermediary who trades for her own
account. The key engine for this result is that, contrary to the intermediary,
the market maker does not observe the composition of customer ﬂow. The
intuition is that the rents earned by the intermediary are paid for by cus-
tomers through an increased price impact (as the market maker earns zero
rents).
Suppose v, the unknown payoﬀ of the asset, is normally distributed with
zero expectation and variance equal to σ2
v. The customers consist of an
informed investor who knows v and an uninformed investor who exogenously
trades an amount u, which is normally distributed with zero expectation and
variance σ2
u.
Without an intermediary, Kyle (1985) ﬁnds the following unique linear
equilibrium:
X(v) = βv, β =
1
2λ
(linear strategy of informed investor)(5)
P(ω) = E[v|ω] = λω, λ =
1
2
σv
σu
(market maker earns zero rents) (6)
where ω = X(v) + u is the aggregate order ﬂow the market maker receives.
We deviate from the standard setting and introduce an intermediary who
observes the origination of the customer order and adds her own order y
30before submitting the aggregate order ﬂow to the market maker. We restrict
y to be a linear order:
y = αv + γu (7)
The informed trader rationally anticipates the intermediary’s action and in-
ternalizes her response when choosing β. We work backward and solve se-
quentially:
1. We condition on λ and β to maximize the intermediary’s expected
proﬁt:
E[(P −v)y] = E[(λω−v)y] = E[(λ((α+β)v+(1+γ)u)−v)(αv+γu)]
(8)
which yields:
α =
1
2
(
1
λ
− β), γ = −
1
2
(9)
We ﬁnd that (i) the intermediary trades less aggressively on the true
value v if the informed customer submits a larger order (higher β) or
if liquidity is lower (higher λ) and that (ii) she rationally takes the
opposite side of the uninformed order (γ < 0).
2. We condition on λ and on the intermediary’s action to maximize proﬁts
for the informed trader and ﬁnd:
β =
1
2λ
(10)
The result is that the aggregate order loads more heavily on the sig-
nal (α + β = 3
4λ > 1
2λ (see equation (5)) as the informed trader now
competes with the intermediary on her information.
3. Given the optimal strategy of the intermediary and the informed trader,
we ﬁnd λ by setting the risk-neutral market maker’s expected proﬁt
31equal to zero, i.e.
E[v|ω] = λω ⇔
cov(ω,v)
var(ω) = λω (11)
⇔ λ =
√
3
2
σv
σu > 1
2
σv
σu (see equation (6))
where ω = ((α + β)v + (1 + γ)u) is the aggregate order the market
maker receives. Equation (11) shows that the price impact is increased
in the presence of an intermediary and identiﬁes two sources for the
increased impact. First, the covariance in the numerator is increased
due to more aggressive trading on the value v. We note, however,
that the denominator is also increased to reﬂect the larger size of the
order. Second, we ﬁnd that the denominator is decreased due to less
net “noise” trading as a result of the intermediary’s strategy to trade
opposite to the uninformed order.
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35Table 1: Announcement and Nonannouncement Days
This table shows the number of announcement and nonannouncement days in our sample, and the frequency
of each announcement. The data on macroeconomic announcements is from the International Money Market
Services (MMS). The announcement days are days on which there is an 8:30 announcement and no other
announcement in the morning (i.e., no 9:15 and 10:00 announcements). Nonannouncement days are days
on which there are no announcements at all in the morning. There are three groups of announcement days:
the ﬁrst group contains all 8:30 announcements, the second group consists of the important announcement
types (Nonfarm Payroll Employment, PPI, and CPI), and the third group contains only the Nonfarm Payroll
Employment announcements. We exclude days when either the realized value or the expectation is missing,
days on which the Fed made an earlier than usual or an unexpected announcement, the day on which the
Durable Goods Orders ﬁgure was announced at 09:00 or 10:00, two days on which the market closed at 11:00
(4/1/94 and 4/5/96) and four days on which the market closed for a part of the day (9/14/94, 8/26/96,
2/26/97 and 2/27/97).
Panel A: Announcement vs. Nonannouncement Days
1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
All Trading Days 253 250 252 250 1,005
Nonannouncement Days 84 91 88 87 350
All Announcement Days 98 90 89 100 377
Nonfarm, PPI, and CPI 27 26 25 27 105
Nonfarm Payroll Employment 9 8 7 10 34
Panel B: Announcement Types and Frequencies
Announcement Type 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
GDP Advance 3 4 1 4 12
GDP Preliminary 3 1 1 2 7
GDP Final 3 0 5 2 10
Nonfarm Payroll Employment 9 8 7 10 34
Retail Sales 9 11 9 12 41
Personal Income 5 3 5 4 17
Personal Consumption Expenditure 5 3 5 4 17
Durable Goods Orders 11 11 8 7 37
Business Inventories 0 0 0 7 7
Net Exports 12 10 11 11 44
Producer Price Index 11 11 11 10 43
Consumer Price Index 7 7 7 7 28
Housing Starts 11 9 10 9 39
Index of Leading Indicators 5 2 6 6 19
Initial Unemployment Claims 40 37 36 43 156Table 2: Trade Statistics by Trader Type and Signed Customer Volume (CTI4)
In Panel A, we show the average number of traders active, number of transactions, trade size (in #contracts)
and bid-ask spread (in $) per ﬁve minute interval for the 30Y treasury futures listed on the Chicago Board
of Trade (CBOT) on both announcement and nonannouncement days. The averages are taken over the full
day in ﬁve minute intervals, we show the variables for diﬀerent trader types. We deﬁne a ﬂoor trader to be
a local (broker) on a day if the proportion of volume for her own account, as a ratio of total (own-account
+ customer) volume, is greater than 98% (smaller than 2%). A ﬂoor trader is a dual on a day if this
proportion is greater than or equal to 2% but less than or equal to 98%. In Panel B we show statistics for
the signed customer volume (CTI4, in 1,000 contracts). We show mean and standard devation (St Dev) for
ﬁve minute intervals as calculated for 8:30-8:45. We split the aggregate signed customer volume to the dual-
and broker-intermediated parts. The sample consists of all trading days in the period 1994 through 1997.
Panel A: Trade Statistics by Trader Type (ﬁve min avg, full day)
Own Account (CTI 1) For Customer (CTI 4)
Ann Nonann Ratio Ann Nonann Ratio
#Traders Active 138.3 116.8 1.18 50.9 42.4 1.20
as a local 98.3 81.4 1.21
as a dual 40.0 35.4 1.13 41.3 34.5 1.20
as a broker 9.6 7.9 1.21
#Transactions 450.3 345.9 1.30 145.7 112.3 1.30
through local 353.3 264.0 1.34
through dual 96.9 81.8 1.18 117.4 90.9 1.29
through broker 28.2 21.4 1.32
Trade Size (in #contracts) 10.9 10.2 1.07 17.5 16.1 1.09
through local 12.0 11.3 1.06
through dual 6.9 6.5 1.07 16.8 15.2 1.11
through broker 20.6 19.6 1.05
Bid-Ask Spreada (in $) 6.4 5.6 1.14
through dual 6.7 5.9 1.13
through broker 4.3 3.4 1.26
a We estimate the bid-ask spread as the diﬀerence between the average (volume-weighted)
customer buy price and the average customer sell price (see also Manaster and Mann (1996)).
Panel B: Signed Customer Volume (CTI4) Statistics (ﬁve min avg, 8:30-8:45)
Nonfarm, PPI, Nonfarm
All Ann and CPI Payroll Emp. Nonann
Signed Cust- Mean All 0.142∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.213 0.058∗
omer Volume (CTI4) Dual 0.108∗∗ 0.224∗∗ 0.122 0.010
(in 1,000 contracts) Broker 0.034 0.077 0.091 0.048∗∗
St Dev All 1.282 1.658 1.789 0.740
Dual 1.164 1.477 1.622 0.663
Broker 0.648 0.888 0.872 0.413
*/** indicates mean signiﬁcant diﬀerent from zero at the 95%/99% level.Table 3: Regressions of 30Y Treasury Return on Signed Customer Volume
(CTI4)
This table reports the estimation results of the following regression:
pt,h − pt,h−1 = da(αa + βaωt,h) + dn(αn + βnωt,h) +
 
k
γkIk,tSk,t + εt,h
where pt,h is 100 times the log price of the 30Y treasury futures at day t and ﬁve minute interval h, da (dn)
is a dummy that is one on an announcement (nonannouncement) day, zero otherwise, ωt,h is the aggregate
signed customer volume (CTI4) divided by 1,000, Sk,t is the announcement surprise, Ik,t is a dummy that is
one for the time interval immediately after the announcement, zero otherwise, and εt,k is the error term. For
estimation, we use the Feasible Eﬃcient GMM procedure with a Newey-West estimator (using three lags)
for standard errors. Panel A reports the estimates of the intercept and signed customer volume coeﬃcients
estimated for 8:30-8:45 based on ﬁve minute intervals and tests for equality of signed customer volume
coeﬃcients. In Panel B we split the estimated signed customer volume coeﬃcients for the sample of all
announcement days in three groups based on dispersion of beliefs. In particular, we follow Pasquariello and
Vega (2007) and estimate the coeﬃcients for days with high, medium and low dispersion of beliefs. High
(low) dispersion is deﬁned as the monthly forecasts’ standard deviation to be in the top 70th (bottom 30th)
percentile of its empirical distribution. The monthly forecasts’ standard deviation is based on the standard
deviation of forecasts for all available 8:30 announcements. We report t-values below coeﬃcient estimates.
Panel A: 30Y Treasury Return Regressions
Nonfarm, PPI, Nonfarm
All Ann and CPI Payroll Emp.
Signed Cust- Ann βa 0.0493∗∗
10.4
0.0544∗∗
6.06
0.0571∗∗
3.77
omer Volume (CTI4) Nonann βn 0.0256∗∗
9.67
0.0256∗∗
9.67
0.0256∗∗
9.67
Intercept Ann αa −0.0118∗∗
−2.75
−0.0364∗∗
−2.69
−0.0974∗∗
−3.26
Nonann αn 0.0033∗
2.32
0.0033∗
2.32
0.0033∗
2.32
#Observations Total 2,181 1,365 1,152
Ann 1,131 315 102
Nonann 1,050 1,050 1,050
R2 0.366 0.354 0.369
p-value of H0: βa = βn 0.0000∗∗ 0.0021∗∗ 0.0410∗
*/** indicates signiﬁcance at the 95%/99% level.
(continued on next page)(continued from previous page)
Panel B: 30Y Treasury Return Regressions with Dispersion of Beliefs
Nonfarm, PPI, Nonfarm
All Ann and CPI Payroll Emp.
Signed Cust- Ann High Het βa,H 0.0596∗∗
7.14
0.0677∗∗
4.41
0.0643∗
2.19
omer Volume (CTI4) Med Het βa,M 0.0489∗∗
7.32
0.0611∗∗
4.5
0.0742∗∗
2.99
Low Het βa,L 0.0365∗∗
3.26
0.0290
1.53
0.0169
0.443
Nonann High Het βn,H 0.0285∗∗
6.34
0.0285∗∗
6.34
0.0285∗∗
6.34
Med Het βn,M 0.0303∗∗
7.96
0.0303∗∗
7.96
0.0303∗∗
7.96
Low Het βn,L 0.0163∗∗
3.04
0.0163∗∗
3.04
0.0163∗∗
3.04
Intercept Ann αa −0.0119∗∗
−2.8
−0.0363∗∗
−2.68
−0.0948∗∗
−3.28
Nonann αn 0.0033∗
2.27
0.0033∗
2.27
0.0033∗
2.27
#Observations Total 2,181 1,365 1,152
Ann 1,131 315 102
Nonann 1,050 1,050 1,050
R2 0.369 0.361 0.378
p-value of H0: βa,H = βn,H 0.0010∗∗ 0.0142∗ 0.2270
βa,M = βn,M 0.0157∗ 0.0289∗ 0.0801
βa,L = βn,L 0.1040 0.5190 0.9880
βa,d = βn,d,d = H,M,L 0.0002∗∗ 0.0102∗ 0.1670
*/** indicates signiﬁcance at the 95%/99% level.Table 4: Return Regressions: Dual- vs. Broker-Intermediated Signed Customer
Volume (CTI4)
This table follows up on Table 3 and decomposes signed customer volume (CTI4) into dual- vs. broker-
intermediated signed customer volume. It reports the estimation results of the following regression:
pt,h − pt,h−1 = da(αa + βd
aωd
t,h + βb
aωb
t,h) + dn(αn + βd
nωd
t,h + βb
nωb
t,h) +
 
k
γkIk,tSk,t + εt,h
where pt,h is 100 times the log price of the 30Y treasury futures at day t and ﬁve minute interval h, da
(dn) is a dummy that is one on an announcement (nonannouncement) day, zero otherwise, ωd
t,h (ωb
t,h) is
the aggregate signed customer volume (CTI4) intermediated by duals (brokers) divided by 1,000, Sk,t is the
announcement surprise, Ik,t is a dummy that is one for the time interval immediately after the announcement,
zero otherwise, and εt,k is the error term. For estimation, we use the Feasible Eﬃcient GMM procedure
with a Newey-West estimator (using three lags) for standard errors. We report the estimates of the intercept
and signed customer volume coeﬃcients estimated for 8:30-8:45 based on ﬁve minute intervals and tests for
equality of signed customer volume coeﬃcients. We report t-values below coeﬃcient estimates.
Return Regressions, Dual- vs. Broker-Intermediated Signed Customer Volume (CTI4)
Nonfarm, PPI, Nonfarm
All Ann and CPI Payroll Emp.
Signed Cust- Ann Dual βd
a 0.0562∗∗
10.0
0.0650∗∗
5.70
0.0762∗∗
3.60
omer Volume (CTI4) Broker βb
a 0.0238∗
2.53
0.0209
1.27
−0.0197
−0.494
Nonann Dual βd
n 0.0265∗∗
8.92
0.0265∗∗
8.92
0.0265∗∗
8.92
Broker βb
n 0.0230∗∗
4.77
0.0230∗∗
4.77
0.0230∗∗
4.77
Intercept Ann αa −0.0119∗∗
−2.79
−0.0367∗∗
−2.72
−0.0931∗∗
−3.23
Nonann αn 0.0035∗
2.34
0.0035∗
2.34
0.0035∗
2.34
#Observations Total 2,181 1,365 1,152
Ann 1,131 315 102
Nonann 1,050 1,050 1,050
R2 0.375 0.366 0.396
p-value of H0: βd
a = βd
n 0.0000∗∗ 0.0011∗∗ 0.0202∗
βb
a = βb
n 0.9400 0.9000 0.2880
βd
a = βb
a 0.0036∗∗ 0.0343∗ 0.0628
βd
n = βb
n 0.5110 0.5110 0.5110
*/** indicates signiﬁcance at the 95%/99% level.Table 5: Own-Account Trading Proﬁts by Trader Type
This table reports summary statistics on the cross-sectional distribution of proprietary trading proﬁts in the
8:30-8:45 interval by trader type. We distinguish two types: those who also trade for customers on the same
day, i.e. duals, and those who do not trade for customers on that day, i.e. locals. We follow Fishman and
Longstaﬀ (1992) and calculate the proﬁts per contract traded round trip. That is, for each trader we subtract
the value of purchases from the value of sales and add the value of end-of-period inventory (assuming zero
inventory at the start). We divide this by the total number of contracts traded to arrive at a proﬁt per
contract traded round trip. Formally, we calculate:
πkt =
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
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where πkt is the proﬁt per round-trip contract for intermediary k on day t, Nb
kt (Ns
kt) is the total number
of buys (sells), qb
jkt (qs
jkt) is the quantity of the jth transaction in terms of number of contracts, P b
jkt (P s
jkt)
is the associated price, and REFPt is the reference price in day t. We assume any remaining inventory
is valued at the last price before 8:45, thus REFPt is the last observed price before 8:45. We show the
mean, standard deviation (St Dev) and the three quartiles (25% Quant, Median and 75% Quant) of the
cross-sectional distribution (across intermediaries) of own-account trading proﬁts (with the number of trader
days in each group in the column #Trader Days).
Own-Account Trading Proﬁts per Contract Traded Round Trip
#Trader 25% 75%
Days Mean St Dev Quant Median Quant
Locals
nonannouncement days 64,713 2.5 38.2 -13.5 0.0xx 20.8
all announcement days 83,516 8.4 67.4 -13.2 7.8∗∗,xx 31.2
nonfarm, PPI, and CPI 25,301 17.0 93.0 -12.1 14.8∗∗,xx 43.9
nonfarm payroll emp. 8,242 26.7 117.8 -11.1 23.7∗∗,xx 62.5
Duals
nonannouncement days 17,181 4.6 46.7 -15.6 2.2xx 31.2
all announcement days 26,474 16.5 99.0 -13.4 13.9∗∗,xx 40.5
nonfarm, PPI, and CPI 8,381 29.6 142.2 -14.2 22.8∗∗,xx 62.5
nonfarm payroll emp. 2,709 49.0 199.1 -12.5 31.3∗∗,xx 101.6
*/** indicates signiﬁcance relative to nonannouncement days at the 95%/99% level.
x/xx indicates signiﬁcance relative to the other trader type at the 95%/99% level (i.e. a
comparison across local and dual proﬁt).Table 6: Own-Account Trading Proﬁts of Nonpure Duals and Pure Locals
This table reports own-account trading proﬁts in the 8:30-8:45 interval of nonpure duals, i.e. intermediaries
who have both dual days (i.e. days they also trade for customers) and local days (i.e. days they do not trade
for customers). Panel A reports cross-sectional statistics across all nonpure duals on the diﬀerence in average
own-account proﬁt for dual days and local days. Panel B reports cross-sectional statistics for the average
own-account proﬁt of nonpure duals on local days and similar statistics for the average own-account proﬁt
of pure locals (i.e. intermediaries that never trade for customers). To obtain own-account trading proﬁts for
each trader we subtract the value of purchases from the value of sales and add the value of end-of-period
inventory (assuming zero inventory at the start). We divide this by the total number of contracts traded to
arrive at a proﬁt per contract traded round trip. Formally, we calculate:
πkt =


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where πkt is the proﬁt per round-trip contract for intermediary k on day t, Nb
kt (Ns
kt) is the total number
of buys (sells), qb
jkt (qs
jkt) is the quantity of the jth transaction in terms of number of contracts, P b
jkt (P s
jkt)
is the associated price, and REFPt is the reference price in day t. We assume any remaining inventory is
valued at the last price before 8:45, thus REFPt is the last observed price before 8:45.
Panel A: Nonpure Duals’ Proﬁt Advantage
on their Dual Days relative to their Local Days
Nonann Ann
Diﬀerence in Proﬁts All Days Days Days
#Nonpure Duals 234 184 200
Mean Proﬁt Advantage 8.6 2.8 13.5
Standard Deviation 59.1 35.9 68.0
25% Quantile -8.3 -12.6 -10.2
Median 5.6 3.5 5.0
75% Quantile 24.6 14.7 34.7
%-age Coeﬀ’s positive 63.2 55.4 58.0
Test z-statistica 4.05 1.47 2.26
a Test statistic standard normal under H0.
Panel B: Trading Proﬁts on Local Days, Pure Locals vs Nonpure Duals
#Trader 25% 75%
Days Mean St Dev Quant Median Quant
Local Days of Pure Local
nonannouncement days 33,083 2.8 37.4 -12.7 0.1 20.4
all announcement days 42,808 8.7 67.2 -13.6 7.8∗∗ 31.2
nonfarm, PPI, and CPI 18,499 16.7 90.2 -11.7 14.4∗∗ 42.7
nonfarm payroll emp. 6,911 26.5 115.8 -11.6 23.4∗∗ 61.7
Local Days of NonPure Dual
nonannouncement days 27,880 2.3 38.3 -13.9 0.0 20.8
all announcement days 36,061 8.5 67.4 -12.9 7.8∗∗ 31.2
nonfarm, PPI, and CPI 5,887 17.8 101.6 -13.5 15.6∗∗ 47.8
nonfarm payroll emp. 1,100 27.7 131.2 -7.8 25.2∗∗ 65.4
*/** indicates signiﬁcance relative to nonannouncement days at the 95%/99% level.
x/xx indicates signiﬁcance relative to the other trader type at the 95%/99% level (i.e. a
comparison across local days of pure local and local days of nonpure dual proﬁt).Table 7: Determinants of Dual Trader’s Own Account Proﬁts on Announcement Days
This table reports the estimation results of the following regression:
πlt = α + β1CUSTlt + β2V OLAt + β3COMPt +
 
k
γk|Skt| + εlt
where πlt is dual l’s own-account proﬁt per round trip trade in the 15 minutes following the announcement on day t, CUSTlt proxies for dual
trader l’s access to customer ﬂow, V OLAt is the volatility measure, COMPt is a competition proxy and is deﬁned as the ratio of the number
of active intermediaries who trade for customers (i.e. dual and brokers) and the number of customer trades, Skt is the macro surprise of
announcement type k, and εlt is the error term. We use four proxies for a dual’s access to customer ﬂow (CTI4): the number of trades of dual
l on day t that come from customers
 
j |Dc
j,l,t| (model (1)), the absolute value of the sum of the signed number of customer trades |
 
j Dc
j,l,t|
(model (2)), the total volume of dual l on day t that comes from customers
 
j qc
j,l,t (model (3)) and the absolute value of the sum of the signed
volume |
 
j Dc
j,l,tqc
j,l,t| (model (4)) where Dc
j,l,t represents the direction (+1 for buy, -1 for sell) of trade j for trader l on day t. We scale the
proxies for access to customer ﬂow CUSTlt with the number of round trips (#RndTripsl,t) for each dual l on each day t as this is also done
for our proﬁts measure πlt. All regressors are demeaned to let the intercept represent the average trading proﬁt per round trip in the 8:30-8:45
interval of a dual on an announcement day. For estimation, we use the Feasible Eﬃcient GMM procedure with a Newey-West estimator (using
three lags) for standard errors.
Dependent Variable: Dual’s Trading Proﬁt per Contract Traded Round Trip in the 8:30-8:45 interval on Ann Days
(1) (1’) (1”) (2) (2’) (2”) (3) (3’) (3”) (4) (4’) (4”)
Proxies for CUSTlt
customer trades  
j |Dc
j,l,t|/#RndTripsl,t 1.07∗∗
3.1
0.646
1.9
0.600
1.75
signed customer trades
|
 
j Dc
j,l,t|/#RndTripsl,t 3.14∗∗
4.44
2.64∗∗
3.82
2.76∗∗
3.78
customer volume  
j qc
j,l,t/#RndTripsl,t 0.0218
1.59
0.00926
0.653
0.00744
0.514
signed customer volume
|
 
j Dc
j,l,tqc
j,l,t|/#RndTripsl,t 0.0656∗
2.16
0.0459
1.47
0.0444
1.45
Intercept 16.5∗∗
26.1
16.5∗∗
26.9
16.5∗∗
26.1
16.5∗∗
26.9
16.5∗∗
26
16.5∗∗
26.8
16.5∗∗
26.1
16.5∗∗
26.8
Controls
volatility 2.93∗∗
3.18
2.87∗∗
3.12
3.00∗∗
3.24
3.00∗∗
3.23
competition −28.0∗
−2.22
−28.0∗
−2.23
−30.5∗
−2.44
−30.2∗
−2.42
surprise? yes yes yes yes
time dummy? yes yes yes yes
#Observations 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474
R2 0.002 0.017 0.040 0.004 0.019 0.042 0.000 0.016 0.039 0.000 0.016 0.040
*/** indicates signiﬁcance at the 95%/99% level.Table 8: Customer Proﬁts of Dual- vs. Broker-Intermediated Trades
This table reports customer trading proﬁts in the 8:30-8:45 interval of dual- and broker- intermediated
customer trades, where dual traders also trade for own-account on that day and brokers do not. We follow
Fishman and Longstaﬀ (1992) and calculate the aggregate customer proﬁts per contract traded round trip.
That is, for each dual and broker trader we subtract the value of her customer purchases from the value of
her customer sales and add the value of end-of-period inventory (assuming zero inventory at the start). We
divide this by the total number of customer contracts traded to arrive at a proﬁt per contract traded round
trip. Formally, we calculate:
πkt =


N
s
kt  
j=1
q
s
jktP
s
jkt −
N
b
kt  
j=1
q
b
jktP
b
jkt + (
N
b
kt  
j=1
q
b
jkt −
N
s
kt  
j=1
q
s
jkt)REFPt

/max(
N
b
kt  
j=1
q
b
jkt,
N
s
kt  
j=1
q
s
jkt),
where πkt is the customer proﬁt per round-trip contract for intermediary k on day t, Nb
kt (Ns
kt) is the total
number of customer buys (sells), qb
jkt (qs
jkt) is the quantity of the jth customer transaction in terms of number
of contracts, P b
jkt (P s
jkt) is the associated price, and REFPt is the reference price in day t. We assume any
remaining inventory is valued at the last price before 8:45, thus REFPt is the last observed price before
8:45. We show the mean, standard deviation (St Dev) and the three quartiles (25% Quant, Median and 75%
Quant) of the cross-sectional distribution (across intermediaries) of her customers’ aggregate trading proﬁts
(with the number of trader days in each group in the column #Trader Days).
Customer Proﬁts per Contract Traded Round Trip
#Trader 25% 75%
Days Mean St Dev Quant Median Quant
Dual-Intermediated Customer Trades
nonannouncement days 17,181 -3.0 65.1 -32.5 0.0x 31.3
all announcement days 26,474 -12.6 129.5 -67.7 -7.3∗∗,xx 49.0
nonfarm, PPI, and CPI 8,381 -22.7 175.8 -104.2 -17.5∗∗ 63.5
nonfarm payroll emp. 2,709 -35.0 225.0 -147.1 -25.8∗∗ 87.3
Broker-Intermediated Customer Trades
nonannouncement days 6,567 -1.3 70.2 -31.3 0.0x 31.3
all announcement days 9,034 -7.3 143.3 -62.5 0.0∗∗,xx 58.0
nonfarm, PPI, and CPI 2,843 -14.9 200.3 -101.7 -11.3∗∗ 73.9
nonfarm payroll emp. 970 -23.2 250.9 -145.4 -19.3∗∗ 94.1
*/** indicates signiﬁcance relative to nonannouncement days at the 95%/99% level.
x/xx indicates signiﬁcance relative to the other trader type at the 95%/99% level (i.e. a
comparison across dual and broker aggregate customer proﬁt).Figure 1: Price and Volume of 30Y Treasury Futures on an Announcement Day
This ﬁgure depicts the prices of the 30Y treasury bond futures listed on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT)
in the interval 8:20-9:00 on May 3, 1996. On this day there was an 8:30 Nonfarm Payroll Employment
announcement. The top graph plots the volume-weighted average price for the second, where we use a circle
(cross) if customer buying volume exceeds (falls below or equals) customer selling volume. The bottom ﬁgure
plots the signed customer volume (CTI4) for every second.
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Signed Customer Volume (CTI4) per Second Figure 2: Intraday Trading Patterns
These ﬁgures depict intraday pattern of volatility (A), volume (B), and the bid-ask spread (C), based on
ﬁfteen minute intervals. The solid (dashed) lines show the intraday pattern for announcement (nonannounce-
ment) days, the solid vertical lines represent the 8:30-8:45 announcement interval. A closed circle indicates
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between announcement and nonannouncement days at the 99% level.
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8:30−8:45 9:30−9:45 10:30−10:45 11:30−11:45 12:30−12:45 13:30−13:45 14:30−14:45Figure 3: Intraday Pattern of Sensitivity of Treasury Return to Signed Customer
Volume (CTI4)
This ﬁgure depicts the coeﬃcient of signed customer volume (CTI4) in the 30Y treasury future return
regressions. It plots this coeﬃcient based on the estimation results of the following regression for all 15
minute intervals in the day:
pt,h − pt,h−1 = da(αa + βaωt,h) + dn(αn + βnωt,h) +
 
k
γkIk,tSk,t + εt,h
where pt,h is 100 times the log price of the 30Y treasury futures at day t and ﬁve minute interval h, da (dn)
is a dummy that is one on an announcement (nonannouncement) day, zero otherwise, ωt,h is the aggregate
signed customer volume (CTI4), Sk,t is the announcement surprise, Ik,t is a dummy that is one for the time
interval immediately after the announcement, zero otherwise, and εt,k is the error term. For estimation,
we use the Feasible Eﬃcient GMM procedure with a Newey-West estimator (using three lags) for standard
errors. The solid (dashed) line depicts the intraday pattern of β for announcement (nonannouncement)
days; the vertical line represents the 8:30-8:45 announcement interval. A closed circle indicates a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between announcement and nonannouncement days at the 99% level.
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